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Humansoftenacceptthestatusquowhenfacedwithconﬂictingchoice
alternatives.However,itisunknownhowneuralpathwaysconnecting
cognition with action modulate this status quo acceptance. Here we
developedavisualdetectiontaskinwhichsubjectstendedtofavorthe
default when making difﬁcult, but not easy, decisions. This bias was
suboptimal in that more errors were made when the default was
accepted.Aselectiveincreaseinsubthalamicnucleus(STN)activitywas
found when the status quo was rejected in the face of heightened
decision difﬁculty. Analysis of effective connectivity showed that
inferior frontal cortex, a region more active for difﬁcult decisions,
exertedanenhancedmodulatoryinﬂuenceontheSTNduringswitches
away from the status quo. These data suggest that the neural circuits
requiredtoinitiatecontrolled,nondefaultactionsaresimilartothose
previously shown to mediate outright response suppression. We
conclude that speciﬁc prefrontal-basal ganglia dynamics are
involved in rejecting the default, a mechanism that may be
important in a range of difﬁcult choice scenarios.
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W
hen faced with a complex decision, people tend to accept
the status quo, as reﬂected in the old adage, “When in
doubt, do nothing.” Indeed, across a range of everyday decisions,
suchaswhethertomovehouseortradeinacar,orevenwhetherto
ﬂip the TV channel, there is a considerable tendency to maintain
the status quo and refrain from acting (1). One factor driving this
status quo bias is the difﬁculty of the decision process. In super-
markets, for example, there is often an overwhelming choice of







are unknown, but informative parallels can be derived from the
effects of treatments for Parkinson’s disease. Akinesia, a core
symptom of Parkinson’s, can be alleviated by disruption of the
basal ganglia either by neurosurgical lesions or deep-brain stim-
ulation (DBS) (4, 5). Despite these beneﬁcial therapeutic effects,
it is known that DBS of the subthalamic nucleus (STN) in Par-
kinson’s patients can lead to impairments of cognitive control
(6–8), suggesting that one of the core functions of the STN is to
modulate basal ganglia circuits involved in decision making
(9–11). An anatomic “hyperdirect” pathway from medial and
lateralprefrontalcortex,previouslycharacterizedinprimates(12)
and humans (13), may mediate cognitive inﬂuences on the STN
(14–16). Here we tested whether interactions between the frontal
cortex and basal ganglia provide candidate mechanisms for how
decision difﬁculty modulates choices involving a status quo.
We asked participants to make sensory judgments in the
context of a tennis “line-judgment” game (Fig. 1A) while under-
going functional MRI(fMRI).Weselectedthisgameonthebasis
of its natural default option—line judges remain silent to indicate
that the ball was “in,” but make an overt response by shouting
“out” to reject the default. Further, such a task involves graded
perceptual difﬁculty (17). A status quo bias in this task can be
modeledbyassumingthatadecisioncriterionisbiaseddepending
on whether the default is set to “IN” or “OUT” (Fig. 1B). The
qualitative prediction from this model is that when the decision is
difﬁcult, a criterion shift has more impact than when the decision
is easy (Fig. 1B, Bottom), leading to a status quo bias on high- but
not low-difﬁculty trials (see Fig. 1 legend for further details of
the model). To examine brain mechanisms for overcoming this
bias, we implemented a simple factorial design by crossing high
and low decision difﬁculty with rejection or acceptance of the
default. Conceptually similar approaches have been used in ani-
mal experiments to decouple the neural processing related to
response execution from that associated with variables affecting
the decision (18).
The status quo bias can be shaped by a number of complex and
interacting factors, such as the economic costs involved in making
the transition (1, 19), aversion to losing what one presently owns
(20, 21), and the potential for regretting a change (22). Here we
restrict our investigation to the ubiquitous factor of decision dif-
ﬁculty, minimizing the inﬂuence ofother, potentially confounding
psychological variables. In our simple visual detection task, the
choice set size remains constant (two-alternative forced-choice),
and outcomes are omitted, allowing examination of the neural
integration of decision difﬁculty with acceptance or rejection of
the status quo.
Results
Behavior. In line with theoretical predictions (Fig. 1B), there was a
greatertendencytoacceptthedefaultonhigh-comparedwithlow-
difﬁculty trials [t(15) = 2.51, P < 0.05; Fig. 2A]. This bias toward
default acceptance was seen in 13 of 16 subjects and importantly
resulted in suboptimal choice behavior. There was an increase in
errors when accepting (compared with rejecting) the default on
high- but not low-difﬁculty trials, leading to an interaction of dif-
ﬁculty andresponse type [F(1,15)= 6.09, P < 0.05]. Posthoc paired
t tests conﬁrmed that this interaction was driven by a signiﬁcant
increase in error rates when the default was accepted on high-
difﬁculty trials relative to when it was rejected [t(15) = 2.45, P <
0.05], with no differences in low-difﬁculty default acceptance and
rejection errors [t(15) = 0.58, P = 0.57]. These behavioral effects
were replicated in a separate experiment (n = 18) outside the
scanner (Fig. S1).
Judgement accuracy on low-difﬁculty trials was 95.1% ± 1.0%
(SEM). By design, accuracy on high-difﬁculty trials was reliably
lower [t(15) = 24.3, P < 0.0001] but remained signiﬁcantly above
chance [58.0% ± 1.3% SEM, one-sample t test against 50%,
t(15) = 5.71, P < 0.001]. As expected, rejection reaction times
(RTs) were greater on high- compared with low-difﬁculty trials
[t(15) = 5.28, P < 0.001]. The distribution of RTs in the two dif-
ﬁculty conditions is shown in Fig. 2B.
We next computed signal detection theory (SDT) measures
from our data by classifying trials according to the model pre-
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Ssented in Fig. 1B (Methods). This analysis conﬁrmed shifts in cri-
teria(c)asafunctionofdefault position(in/out)onhigh-difﬁculty
trials (cin = 0.31, cout = −0.48) but not low-difﬁculty trials (cin =
0.049,cout =0.0052),leading toa signiﬁcantinteraction ofdefault
and difﬁculty level [F(1,15) = 9.84, P < 0.01]. Changes in sensitivity
(d′)duetodifﬁcultyleveldidnotinteractwithdefaultposition[in/
out; F(1,15) < 1, P = 0.69].
fMRI Analysis. Our behavioral ﬁndings of a status quo bias for high-
but not low-difﬁculty trials motivated us to explore the neural basis
of this interaction. Crucially, we were interested in regions showing
differentialactivityforrejectionofthestatusquounderhighbutnot
low difﬁculty. To isolate such regions, we computed an interaction
contrast [reject_high − accept_high] − [reject_low − accept_low]. In
this interaction we found activation in right STN region that sur-
vived correction for the whole brain [P < 0.05, family-wise error
(FWE) corrected; Fig. 3A; see SI Text and Fig. S2 for anatomic
localization). Similar activation was found in left STN region [P <
0.05, small-volume corrected (SVC); Fig. 3A]. No other brain
regions survived whole-brain correction, and the reverse contrast
did not reveal any other signiﬁcant interaction effects. To further
explore the observed interaction, we computed percentage signal
change for each trial type, averaging over all voxels within ana-
tomicallydeﬁnedSTNregionsofinterest(ROIs)(11)andentered
thesevaluesintoarepeated-measuresANOVA[factorsSTN_side
(left/right) × decision (accept/reject) × difﬁculty (high/low)]. We
conﬁrmeda signiﬁcant interaction between decision difﬁculty and
default rejection [F(1,15) = 17.70, P < 0.001] that was consistent
across both left and right STN [no three-way interaction with



































which the default was systematically manipulated in a balanced factorial
design. At the beginning of each trial, participants were asked to depress the
“default” key and ﬁxate on the cross between the two tramlines. They then
sawaballlandonthecourt,beforebeingaskedtomakeadecisiononwhether
it was “IN” (overlapping the line) or “OUT.” This decision was indicated by
continuing to depress the key to accept the default, or releasing it and
switching to the opposite key to reject. Easy and difﬁcult (low and high
difﬁculty)trialswererandomlyinterleavedwithinablockandbalancedacross
whetherthecorrectresponsewastoacceptorrejectthedefault.(B)Apossible




(Left) but overlap considerably for high-difﬁculty decisions (Right). The verti-
callineineachcaserepresentsthedecisioncriterion—howtheobserversplices
up this decision axis to report IN or OUT. The upper row shows an ideal
observer’s neutral criterion (black line), the lower row a criterion biased
toward the accepting the default (blue line; here, reporting “IN”). A shifted
criterion has more impact on stimuli drawn from overlapping probability














































































Fig. 2. Behavioral results. (A) Status quo bias was calculated as the percent-
age of default acceptance greater than 50% on both high- and low-difﬁculty















































Fig. 3. Interaction of decision difﬁculty and default rejection. (A) T-map for
the interaction contrast [(reject_high − accept_high) − (reject_low −
accept_low)], shown in coronal and axial sections (Right: P < 0.05, whole-
brain corrected; Left: P < 0.05, SVC; shown at P < 0.005, uncorrected).
Activity is seen bilaterally in the region of the STN (peak voxels; Left: −6,
−24, −3; Right: 12, −18, 0). Insets: Overlap between the active clusters and
STN ROIs (10 × 10 × 10-mm boxes centered on ±10, −15, −5). (B) Average
difference in percentage signal change (reject − accept) calculated from an
unbiased average of all voxels within each STN box ROI. Events are split as a
function of difﬁculty level. High-difﬁculty trials were further split into cor-
rect and incorrect (the relative rarity of an incorrect, low-difﬁculty response
precluded the same split on low-difﬁculty trials). The interaction effect was
driven by a greater STN response for rejecting the default on high- com-
pared with low-difﬁculty trials. Post hoc paired t tests: *P < 0.05, **P < 0.005.
Error bars reﬂect ±SEM.
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activity on trials in which the default is rejected in the face of high
decision difﬁculty,asshown inFig. 3B. Thisdifferenceissimilarfor
both correct and incorrect responses (no difference between gray
andwhite barsinFig.3B),suggestingthatthebehavioraldifference
inaccuracyforaccept_highandreject_highresponsescannotexplain
the signal change we observe in the STN.
As expected, we found a widespread motor network (Table S1)
whencontrastingreject >acceptresponses, withgreateractivityon
the left side consistent with rejection responses being made with
thecontralateral(right)hand.Thereversecontrast,accept>reject,
did not reveal any signiﬁcant activations. Contrasting both trial
types against baseline revealed activity in the pre–supplementary
motor area that was common to both decision types (Fig. S3 and
SI Text). Activity in bilateral inferior frontal cortex (IFC; P < 0.05,
FWE whole-brain corrected) and bilateral medial frontal cortex
(MFC; both P < 0.05, SVC) correlated with increasing RT for
rejecting the default (Fig. 4A and Table S2). We saw additional
main effects of decision difﬁculty in both MFC (P < 0.05, FWE
whole-brain corrected) and IFC (P < 0.001, uncorrected) (Table
S3), in line with speciﬁc recruitment of these regions during sit-
uations requiring increased cognitive control (10, 15). The para-
metric correlation with RT did not interact with difﬁculty level
(P > 0.005, uncorrected), suggesting that our low-difﬁculty con-
dition may still have induced some degree of adaptive slowing (cf.
ref. 10). Other regions activated in these contrasts are detailed in
Tables S2 and S3.
Modeling Neural Interactions During Status Quo Rejection. We
hypothesized that the signal observed in the STN may reﬂect an
integration of inputs from frontal cortical regions sensitive to deci-
sion difﬁculty, making status quo acceptance less likely. We there-
fore tested a connectivity model (dynamic causal model; DCM)
derived from theoretical models of action selection (8, 9, 23) in
which both MFC and IFC, anatomically connected with the STN
region in humans (13), were hypothesized as providing biasing
inﬂuences. Building on the known role of right IFC (rIFC) in cog-
nitive control (14) and the robust interaction effect we see in right
STN, we restrict our DCM analysis to the right hemisphere (Table
S4). Our primary aim was to establish how trial-by-trial decision
difﬁculty and the likelihood of default rejection inﬂuence infor-
mation ﬂow in this circuit, thus constituting a possible mechanistic
explanation for the interaction effect seen in the STN (24). More
speciﬁcally, we asked whether default rejection is reﬂected in a
modulationofconnectionstrengthfromrIFCtoSTN,fromMFCto
STN, or both.
In DCM, the statistical likelihood that an evoked response is
driven by activity in another brain area is modeled by a set of
coupled bilinear differential equations (25), resting on a gen-
erative model of underlying neural activity. In our model, the
modulatory inﬂuence of default rejection (reject) was inferred
fromtheresponsesofthesubjectonanygiventrial,andistakento
reﬂecttheintentional“hidden”stateofthedecisionmakerduring
the choice period. A driving input to frontal cortical areas was
provided by a variable encoding trial-by-trial difﬁculty (high =1 ,
low = 0), which could enter into either rIFC, MFC, or both.
Bayesian model comparison revealed the class of models with
difﬁculty entering into the network via the rIFC to be superior to
other considered model classes (Fig. S4; combined exceedence
probability of 87.9%). Within this class of models, models 5 and 6
had similar exceedence probabilities, with model 6 differing from
model 5 by a single extra parameter (reject modulating MFC to
STN, which did not reach group-level signiﬁcance). We focus on
the simplest winning model 5 shown in Fig. 4B, while noting that
results from model 6 (reported in Table S5 and SI Text) support
similar conclusions.
Crucially, connectivity was systematically increased from rIFC
to STN when subjects rejected the default [0.06 s
−1, t(13) = 2.43,
P < 0.05]. Baseline (endogenous) connectivity from rIFC to STN
was on average positive (mean = 0.04 s
−1), but was not signiﬁcant
in the absence of default-related modulation (P = 0.34). Because
modulatory parameters (in this case, the inﬂuence of default rej-
ection)inDCMareexpressedasfractionsofbaselineconnectivity,
we infer that default rejection invokes prefrontal–STN dynamics
that are largely absent when the status quo is accepted. Baseline
connectivity wasconsistently positivefromrIFCtoMFC[0.17s
−1,
t(13) = 4.11, P < 0.005] and from MFC to rIFC [0.02 s
−1, t(13) =
2.68, P < 0.05] and was signiﬁcantly greater from rIFC to MFC
than in the reverse direction [t(13) = 4.25, P < 0.001]. Decision
difﬁcultywasasigniﬁcantdriverofrIFC[0.03s
−1,t(13)=3.53,P<
0.005]. To summarize, our DCM results are consistent with a
robustly increased drive from rIFC to STN when the default is
rejected in the face of increased decision difﬁculty.
Discussion
Our results show that participants are more likely to accept the
status quo when faced with difﬁcult choices, leading to more
errors.Thissuboptimalchoicebehaviorimpliesthatthestatusquo
bias may disconnect people’s preferences from their subsequent
choices.Forexample,employeesoftenacceptacompany’sdefault
retirement plan even if it leads to poorer investments (26). Sim-
ilarly, consumers become impassive in the face of overwhelming
choice, leading to a fall in the number of purchases (3). Common
toboththesescenariosisadifﬁcultdecisionandtheopportunityto
remain with the status quo.
Our brain imaging ﬁndings provide a neural basis for how such a
statusquobiasmightbeovercome.InourfMRIdata,rejectionofthe
defaultondifﬁculttrialsrecruitedbilateralregionsencompassingthe
STN, a component of the basal ganglia thought to play a pivotal role
in action selection (5, 9). Speciﬁcally, blood oxygen level–dependent
(BOLD)signalincreasedinbothleftandrightSTNwhenthedefault
was rejected on difﬁcult, but not easy, trials. This effect was not
explained by a change in decision accuracy. Instead, the interaction
suggests a speciﬁc role for STN activity in overcoming a status quo
bias induced by increasing choice difﬁculty.
Our connectivity model further provides a possible mechanistic
explanation both for the difﬁculty-induced bias toward the status
quo shown in Fig. 2A and the pattern of STN signal change shown
in Fig. 3B. On easy trials, a bias favoring inaction may not need to
be militated against to maintain accurate decisions (Fig. 1B, Left).
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Fig. 4. Effects of decision difﬁculty and default rejection on connectivity.
(A) Coronal sections are shown through the group T-map for positive cor-
relations with the RT regressor (shown at P < 0.005, uncorrected). Circled are
the regions that were entered into the subsequent connectivity analysis. (B)
Schematic showing the winning DCM model and the pattern of signiﬁcant
connections. Default rejection (reject) was associated with increased inﬂu-
ence of the rIFC on the STN. *P < 0.05, **P < 0.005.














































difﬁculty is causal in tempering this bias (making decision criteria
more “neutral” under high-difﬁculty conditions; Fig. 1B). This
context-dependence of STN activity is consistent with ﬁndings
from DBS studies that report a role for the STN under conditions
of high but not low difﬁculty (6–8). An alternative account might
suggest that the activation we observe is epiphenomenal, rather
than being causal in the amelioration of a status quo bias. We
considerthispossibilityaslesslikely,foranumberofreasons.First,
the activity increase observed is speciﬁc to rejecting a difﬁcult
default,ratherthanrejectionofthedefaultperse,andisnoteasily
explained through simple correlation with motor output or deci-
sionaccuracy.Second,theeffectsweobserveareconsistentacross
bilateral STN, a region proposed as a key node for control of
decision making (9, 10). Finally, and perhaps most persuasively,
DBSinParkinson’sdiseaserevealsacausalrolefortheSTNinthe
modulation of decision making (6–8, 27, 28), and lesions to the
STN in rodents produce impaired response selection under sit-
uations of high conﬂict (29, 30).
The pattern of activity in the STN region can be further exam-
ined in the context of two inﬂuential models that address the
broader role of the basal ganglia in decision making (9, 10). In
brief,itisproposedthatactivationofstriatalneuralpopulationsby
salientsensorystimulidrivesselectionofanappropriateresponse,
releasing the pallidal inhibition of the thalamus. A “hyperdirect”
pathway from frontal cortex to the STN (12) leads to modulation
ofpallidal–thalamic responses as a result of decision difﬁculty (9),
adjusting basal ganglia output. In support of a hyperdirect mod-
ulation of STN activity, we ﬁnd that an inferior frontal region
sensitive to task difﬁculty drives the STN in our DCM. Within our
taskandmodelconstraintsdefault-relatedmodulationoftheSTN
wasbestexplainedbyapathwayfromrIFC,consistentwithadirect
white matter tract linking these regions (12, 13). However, we
anticipate a contribution of the MFC to STN modulation in other
scenarios, such as outright response inhibition (see below) and
notedatasuggestinginﬂuencesofmidlineEEGpotentialsonSTN
responses (31, 32). In addition, both IFC and MFC activity may
affect default rejection in our task via pathways that bypass the
basalganglia, consistent withshort-latency modulation ofprimary
motor responses after stimulation of these structures (33, 34).
Studies ofthestop-signalRTtask using fMRIhave isolatedboth
therIFC andSTNascriticalnodes instoppingofresponses(11,35,
36).DisruptingrIFCwithtranscranialmagneticstimulationleadsto
failure of response inhibition (37), and individual differences in
rIFCvolumepredictsuccessfulstopping(38).Similarly,DBSofthe
STN in patients with Parkinson’s disease directly modulates stop-
signal RTs (27, 28). In our task, a simple inhibitory account ofSTN
function would suggest greater activity when a difﬁcult default is
accepted(lackofaction),whereasanaccountthatemphasizesarole
for the STN in controlled responding would predict greater activity
when the default is rejected. Our data favor the latter view, and
together with related evidence (13, 16) implicate the STN in both
outright response suppression and controlled slowing or switching.
Indeed,theacceptanceorrejectionofaprepotentresponsemaybe
orthogonal to the action-inhibition distinction. In some situations
the default is to respond and the controlled response is to inhibit,
whereas in others (such as when judging the line in tennis), the
default is to remain silent, and the controlled response is to initiate
an overtaction (39).Thishypotheticaldissociationraisesintriguing
and testable hypotheses for further interventional research: if the
dominant function of the STN is to inhibit action, then lesions or
electricaldisruptioninatasksuchasoursshouldresultinatendency
to respond, and a decreased status quo bias. However, if its domi-
nant function is to initiate a controlled mode of responding, STN
dysfunction would lead to an increased status quo bias.
In summary, we describe a neural mechanism for overcoming a
difﬁculty-induced status quo bias centered on IFC/STN. We show
that difﬁcult choice scenarios lead to greater acceptance of the
status quo (see also refs. 2 and 3), resulting in suboptimal decision
making. Using a model of effective connectivity inspired by com-
putational models of action selection (9, 10), we provide evidence
thatIFCincreasesitsinﬂuenceontheSTNwhenadifﬁcultdefault
is rejected. Our task was intended to elucidate the mechanisms
involved in overcoming a status quo bias for simple perceptual
decisions requiring overt actions, and we are cautious in extrap-
olatingthemechanismsunderlyingasimilarbiasformorecomplex
cognitive or value-based decisions. However, taken together, our
results suggest that rejection of the status quo during difﬁcult
decisionsinvokesspeciﬁcneuraldynamicswithinprefrontal–basal
ganglia circuitry. At a broader level such mechanisms may con-
tribute to rejecting the default in scenarios ranging from retire-





because of poor behavioral performance (33% errors on low-difﬁculty trials).
Sixteen subjects’ data were analyzed (5 male; 19–34 years of age; mean age,
25.3 years). The study was approved by the Institute of Neurology (University





asked to maintain ﬁxation and were instructed that not doing so would




an optical keypad and consisted of a go/no-go decision to reject or accept the
default, respectively. See Fig. 1 legend and SI Text for further details.
Behavioral Analysis. Behavioralresponseswereclassiﬁedaccordingtowhether
thetrialledtoarejectionoracceptanceofthedefault,andwhetherthetrialwas
high or low difﬁculty. A status quo bias was assessed by comparing the pro-
portionoftrialsleadingtoanacceptance responseonhigh-andlow-difﬁculty
trials,usingatwo-tailedpairedttest.Eachparticipant’sdecisioncriteria(c)and
sensitivity (d′) were estimated from the data using signal detection theory
(SDT; see Fig. 1B), whereby the hit rate (H) was deﬁned as p(“in”|ball = in) and
false alarm rate (F)a sp(“in”|ball = out). Decision criteria and d′ for each dif-
ﬁculty level(high/low, indexedbyi)anddefault position (in/out,indexedbyj)
can then be calculated as follows (40), where z is the inverse of the normal
distribution function:


















SDT parameters and error rates were analyzed using repeated-measures
ANOVA.
fMRI Analysis. We acquired brain data using a 3T Allegra scanner (Siemens). See SI
Text for details of image acquisition and preprocessing. Functional data were
analyzed using SPM5 (www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Stimulus onsets were separated
into two regressors depending on the perceptual difﬁculty on each trial (high/low).
Choice screen onsets were separated into six regressors dependent on whether the
trial was high/low difﬁculty, whether it led to an accept/reject response, and, on
high-difﬁculty trials, whether this response was correct or incorrect (reject_
high_correct, reject_high_incorrect, reject_low, accept_high_correct, accept_
high_incorrect,accept_low).Responseaccuracy(correct/incorrect)wasnotmodeled
as a separate factor on low-difﬁculty trials, given the relative rarity of incorrect
responses (4.9% ± 1.0%, SEM). The reject stick functions were parametrically
modulated by the reaction time on each trial, and the cumulative feedback stick
functionwasmodulatedbytheamountofmoneywonontheprevious10trials.Our
critical contrast of interest (the interaction of default rejection and difﬁculty, col-
lapsing across correct/incorrect) was computed as follows: [reject_high_correct =
+0.5; reject_high_incorrect =+ 0 . 5 ;reject_low = −1; accept_high_correct = −0.5;
accept_high_incorrect = −0.5; accept_low =+ 1 ] .
6008 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0910380107 Fleming et al.Cluster-based statistics were used to deﬁne signiﬁcant activations both on
their intensity and spatial extent (41). Clusters were deﬁned using a
threshold of P < 0.005 and corrected for multiple comparisons within a given
search volume using FWE correction and a threshold of P < 0.05. SVC was
applied to a priori ROIs in the STN and MFC. See SI Text for further details.
Connectivity Analysis. We conductedDCM analysis using SPM8 (www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.
ac.uk/spm). DCM models neuraldynamicsin asystemofinteractingbrain regions
by representing the population activity at the neural level with a single state
variable for each region (25); see SI Text for further details. We constructed nine
DCMs covering the three combinations of default rejection affecting the ﬂow of
information from frontal cortexto STN, crossed with three possible architectures
forhowdecisiondifﬁcultyaffectsthenetwork.Speciﬁcally,difﬁcultyeitherdrove
rIFC,MFC,orboth;rejecteithermodulatedrIFCtoSTN,MFCtoSTN,orboth.Inall
nine models each of the three areas was reciprocally connected, according to
known anatomic connectivity in humans and macaques (12, 13). See SI Text for
details of time series selection. These models were compared at the group level
using a random-effects procedure implemented in SPM8 (42). Once the best
modelwasestablished,wedeterminedwhichsetofconnectionswasconsistently
affectedbydefaultrejectionacrosssubjects.Thiswasrealizedbyapplyingclassical
statistics at the second level to the maximum a posteriori estimates of the
parameters from individual subject DCMs, using a two-tailed t test against zero.
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